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Abstract
I develop a framework to examine the effect of measurement on productive activity in the face
of moral hazard. I allow an agent intricate control over the stochastic value of a firm’s assets,
and he is compensated based on a report produced by an accounting system that admits a large
class of bias- and timing-oriented accounting measurement rules.
When measurement error is unavoidable but is treated to address the moral hazard prob-
lem, (i) the fundamental earnings distribution develops asymmetric tails and discontinuities
at predictable thresholds, (ii) measurement rules develop all-or-nothing recognition properties
and are rarely unconditionally biased, and (iii) the contract develops caps, floors, and hurdle
bonuses at predictable thresholds.
In contrast, when measurement error can be reduced by delaying measurement until un-
certainty has been resolved, historical cost accounting is unambiguously optimal in curtailing
moral hazard. However, I show that an accounting regulator with alternative objectives can
influence economic activity by mandating timely measurement. Specifically, I show that timely
loss recognition induces firms that are more (less) averse to downside risk to contract for riskier
(less risky) actions.
Finally, I show that first best actions are implementable in my setting via a two-wage
penalty contract only if the measurement rule is extremely noisy and unconditionally conser-
vative. Furthermore, the agent charges a negligible risk premium if he is sufficiently optimistic
about the odds of avoiding a penalty-triggering earnings report. In other words, unconditionally
conservative measurement can disable moral hazard when the agent is optimistic.
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vPrologue: Simplification by Generalization
In this collection of essays I present a general framework that relaxes many of the restrictions
imposed in the extant moral hazard literature, and I demonstrate that relaxing these restrictions
produces novel and empirically relevant predictions. The classical moral hazard problem is
characterized by a principal who employs an agent to provide some unobservable productive
input. Since this input, or action, is unobservable, the agent is inclined to act in his own best
interests unless he is incentivized to do otherwise. Therefore, the principal’s problem is to select
(i) an action to incentivize, (ii) a performance measure that is informative about the action
actually taken, and (iii) a contract, written on the performance measure, that induces the agent
to take the desired action.
In an attempt to solve this complex problem, academic researchers have tended to place
restrictions on one or more of the principal’s choice variables. The most common approach is
to assume that the agent’s action parametrically influences the distribution of economic profit
consumed by the principal. A common representation is to allow the agent to choose an action
a ∈ [
¯
a, a¯], where a affects the central tendency of the distribution of profit f(pi|a).
While this approach simplifies the agent’s action space, it creates an additional technical
hurdle. Namely, it implies that there are many contracts that induce the agent to take any
given action a. The principal’s (and, therefore, the researcher’s) problem is thus to identify
the best contract to offer among the set of incentive compatible contracts. Generally speaking,
nailing down the properties of the optimal contract tends to burn up most of the researcher’s
mathematical gunpowder. Once this has been done, very little can be said about the properties
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of optimal actions, which, in all fairness, aren’t all that interesting in the first place given the
restriction on the agent’s action space.
In this work I employ an assumption initially introduced to the literature by Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987), and allow the agent nonparametric control over the distribution of economic
profits. By allowing the agent to choose the probability of every outcome, (i) the number
of incentive compatible, individually rational contracts is reduced to one, and (ii) the agent’s
actions become much more interesting. By taking this approach, I no longer need to exhaust
my degrees of freedom in nailing down the properties of the optimal contract; the unique
implementing contract in my setting is very simple. Instead, I can focus my attention on the
properties of optimal actions, which can now include empirically relevant behavior such as
asset substitition and real activities manipulation. In other words, a more general action space
actually makes the contracting problem easier to solve.
I begin in Chapter 1 by developing the framework and by characterizing productive actions,
measurement rules, and contracts that solve the moral hazard problem when performance
measures are subject to measurement error. First, I show that the optimal action induces
a fundamental earnings distribution with asymmetric tails and discontinuities at predictable
thresholds, consistent with empirical evidence. Second, I show that optimal measurement
rules possess all-or-nothing recognition properties – consistent with the recognition criteria for
contingent liabilities, leases, and certain allowance accounts – and are rarely unconditionally
biased. Finally, I show that the optimal earnings-based contract develops caps, floors, and
hurdle bonuses at predictable thresholds, which is also consistent with practice and notably
inconsistent with nearly all prior theoretical characterizations of optimal contracts.
In Chapter 2 I assume that the contracting parties take the measurement rule as exogenous,
chosen by an accounting regulator. I derive a formal link between timeliness and measurement
error in this setting, and I show that timely loss recognition can either increase or decrease
downside risk depending on cross-sectional firm characteristics such as liquidity. I also suggest
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that uniform accounting standards can actually cause firms’ production and risk profiles to
become more similar. While my work in this chapter is preliminary, I believe there is great
potential for better understanding the impact of accounting regulation on individual contracts
and aggregate production.
Finally, in Chapter 3 I provide sufficient conditions for severe noise and conservative bias to
be strictly desirable in the face of moral hazard. I show that first best actions are implementable
in my setting via a penalty contract designed after Mirrlees (1974) only if the measurement
system is extremely noisy and unconditionally conservative. Furthermore, the agent charges
a negligible risk premium if he is sufficiently optimistic about the odds of avoiding a penalty-
triggering earnings report. The model predicts that optimistic managers receive less variable
compensation and demand lower risk premia than do neutral or pessimistic managers. To
the extent that innovative managers are more optimistic and are better able to augment asset
value, the model also rationalizes unconditionally conservative measurement of research and
development and other innovation-dependent intangibles.
1Chapter 1
A Flexible Framework for the Examination of
Stewardship-Oriented Production, Measurement, and Contracts
“A [theory] is important if it ‘explains’ much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common
and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the
phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on the basis of them alone.”
— Henry Friedman (1953)
In this chapter I develop a general representation of the moral hazard problem that places
very few restrictions on productive activity, accounting measurement, and contractual form. I
demonstrate that this formulation of moral hazard is capable of rationalizing many empirical
regularities that have long interested and puzzled accounting researchers. Specifically, the model
explains (i) asymmetric earnings distributions with discontinuities at predictable thresholds,
(ii) all-or-nothing recognition criteria and conditionally-biased measurement rules, and (iii)
contracts that exhibit caps, floors, and hurdle bonuses. While several of these regularities can
be explained by alternative idiosyncratic theories, this chapter presents a holistic theory of
moral hazard that is capable of explaining “much by little.”
The classical moral hazard problem is characterized by a principal who employs an agent to
provide some personally costly, unobservable, but valuable productive input, or action. Since
2the action is unobservable, the agent is inclined to take an action that is suboptimal from
the principal’s perspective unless he is incentivized to do otherwise. Therefore, the principal’s
problem is to select (i) an action to incentivize, (ii) a performance measure that is informative
about the action actually taken, and (iii) a contract, written on the performance measure, that
induces the agent to take the desired action.
Because the problem consists of three complex choice variables, a general mathematical
solution has long evaded academic researchers. The universally-applied remedy is to curtail
the problem’s complexity by placing exogenous restrictions on the set of feasible actions, the
properties of performance measures, and/or the contractual form. For example, Holmstro¨m
(1979) abstracts away from the selection of a performance measure and restricts the set of
actions to those that satisfy the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Condition. Research based on Gigler
and Hemmer (2001) considers properties of the performance measure such as conservatism, but
typically restricts attention to a binary action space (e.g., high versus low effort) to do so. The
“LEN” literature imposes strong exogenous assumptions on all three choice variables: contracts
are restricted to be linear in normally-distributed performance measures whose means – and
means alone – are chosen by the agent.
In this work I leverage an assumption introduced by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) that
allows me to simultaneously characterize optimal actions, performance measures, and contracts
while avoiding severe exogenous restrictions on these choice variables. Specifically, I allow
the agent to independently control all moments of the production function by letting him
directly choose the probability of each outcome. In more applied terms, the agent has power
over the firm’s strategy, projects, product mix, risk profile, growth rate, and indeed its most
fundamental characteristics.1 This is in sharp contrast to the majority of the literature which
1While Holmstrom and Milgrom point out that their approach offers opportunities to better understand the
selection of these characteristics, their focus lies primarily on identifying a setting that produces tractable
contracts. As they push their model to its continous time limit, the agent’s intricate control over the distribution
of firm output disappears and he is left controlling only the mean of a normal distribution.
3allows the agent independent control of the mean, and sometimes the variance, of firm output.2
By expanding the agent’s control over production, it turns out that the moral hazard problem
actually becomes easier to solve.
The second ingredient in my framework is a novel analytical representation of an account-
ing system that admits a large class of measurement alternatives. The system is characterized
by two parameters per fundamental outcome, each respectively specifying the probability of
aggressive and conservative measurement given that outcome. The sum of these parameters
determines the degree of noise or measurement error in the accounting system, which I here
assume is prohibitively costly to eliminate. More importantly, the realization rule, fair value, un-
conditional conservatism, conditional conservatism, unconditional aggression, and conditional
aggression are each captured by appropriate specifications of the aggressive and conservative
parameters.
The model’s solution yields two sets of empirically descriptive predictions. The first set
of predictions is driven by measurement error, which increases dispersion in earnings. This
dispersion makes extreme earnings realizations more likely, thereby exposing the agent to ad-
ditional compensation risk, all else equal. In response, the principal shields the agent from this
excess risk by introducing caps and floors to the contract. Moreover, the capped and floored
regions become larger as the agent’s risk aversion increases or as measurement error becomes
more severe. Murphy (1999, 2013) documents that caps and floors are the empirical norm in
accounting-based bonus plans, but they are notably inconsistent with nearly all prior theoretical
2Very few moral hazard studies allow the rich set of distributions afforded by Holmstrom and Milgrom’s nonpara-
metric action assumption. Two notable exceptions are Hellwig (2007) and Bertomeu (2008), whose findings
uncover a potential deficiency in models that only allow the agent control over a single central parameter.
That is, the principal’s primary concern as he moves from a first best to a second best world is how to trade
off actions that are productively efficient with actions that expose the agent to less risk. Since risk exposure
depends on both the implementing contract and the implemented distribution, an important lever that the
principal would like to pull is missing in models where actions are ranked only on average productivity.
4characterizations of optimal contracts.3 In fact, Murphy and Jensen (2011) call for practitioners
to eliminate caps and floors from compensation contracts since they appear suboptimal based
on existing theories. My model indicates that such a prescription may be premature.
While caps and floors shield the agent from excessive measurement risk, they also decrease
the agent’s incentive to take actions that increase upside risk and decrease downside risk. Such
actions lead to asymmetry in the tails of the fundamental earnings distribution. Prior empirical
studies suggests that the observed direction of asymmetry depends heavily on the specification
(e.g., see Panels A versus B of Fig. 1 in Durtschi and Easton 2005, and Figure 2 versus Figure 4
in Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson 2007), while others have documented cross-sectional variation
in earnings skewness (e.g., Gu and Wu 2003). My model indicates that a greater degree of
measurement error and moral hazard is likely to promote fundamental earnings distributions
with thicker lower tails and thinner upper tails.
Not only do caps and floors decrease the agent’s incentives to take actions with high upside
and low downside risk, but they also promote actions that are less productive on average. This
is because aggressive (conservative) measurement of moderate fundamental performance fails
to expose the agent to a potential payoff above (below) the cap (floor). In order to partially
restore these damaged incentives, the principal chooses a measurement rule that makes the
caps and floors more likely to attain; that is, he chooses a measurement rule that is aggressive
over relatively high outcomes and that is conservative over relatively low outcomes. Such a
measurement rule parallels “all-or-nothing” recognition criteria that are common in practice.
For example, contingent liabilities are either recorded at their probable amounts or are left off
the balance sheet altogether; an allowance for deferred tax assets is either booked at the asset’s
full value or is completely ignored; capital leases are recorded at value whereas operating leases
have no place on the balance sheet.
3One partial exception is Arya, Glover, and Mittendorf (2007), who justify bonus caps, but not floors, in a
setting with organizational hierarchies.
5My second set of predictions hinges on the ability of the measurement system to cleanly
distinguish performance that exceeds some threshold from performance that falls short. Au-
diting is likely to create such separation, since auditors have an increased mandate to disallow
misstatements across qualitatively significant thresholds.4 These thresholds are likely to in-
clude zero or consensus analyst forecasts, since internal and external parties have incentives to
closely scrutinize measured performance approaching these values. Moreover, certain transac-
tion characteristics themselves point to zero as a likely candidate for such threshold precision:
for example, while a contingent loss may be difficult to value, it is usually easy to distinguish
from a contingent gain.
Given the existence of a threshold that separates performance into distinct ranges, the
contract naturally develops a hurdle bonus at the threshold as measurement error becomes
more severe. This is, again, because dispersion in earnings exposes the agent to risk that
can be avoided by reducing within-range variation in the contract. The result is a discrete
“jump” in the contract at the threshold. Such hurdle bonuses are consistent with Murphy
(1999, 2013). Moreover, I predict that hurdle bonuses are larger when the agent is more risk
averse and when measurement error is more severe, and they should arise at thresholds across
which misclassification is difficult or unlikely.
In order to increase his chances of securing the hurdle bonus, the agent rationally takes
actions promoting a discontinuity in the fundamental earnings distribution at the threshold. In
contrast to explanations based on the manipulation of reported earnings, these discontinuities
arise in my model precisely because misclassification of missed versus met targets – whether
4Auditing standards specify that “[a]s a result of the interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations
in materiality judgments, uncorrected misstatements of relatively small amounts could have a material effect
on the financial statements....” and that “a misstatement made intentionally could be material for qualitative
reasons, even if relatively small in amount” (PCAOB 2010 A7 par. 17). More specifically, the standards specify
that the qualitative factors to consider in the auditor’s evaluation of materiality include “[a] misstatement that
changes a loss into income or vice versa” and “[a] misstatement that has the effect of increasing management’s
compensation, for example, by satisfying the requirements for the award of bonuses or other forms of incentive
compensation” (PCAOB 2010 A7 par. B2).
6by error or manipulation – is explicitly disallowed. Moreover, the model rationalizes a contract
that promotes discontinuities, whereas the earnings management explanation fails to explain
why contracts do not “fix” the deviant behavior. Furthermore, the explanations can perhaps
be disentangled empirically by examining other measures of fundamental performance such as
cash flows, because my prediction pertains to the distribution of fundamental earnings whereas
the earnings management explanation applies to the distribution of reported earnings.
Finally, I show that if the agent’s cost function satisfies a certain robustness property,
then optimal measurement rules condition the direction of bias on a single threshold. Many
measurement rules applied in practice possess this property, conditional conservatism and the
realization rule included. While this result depends critically on idiosyncratic properties of the
agent’s cost function, it turns out that typical deviations from this case result in measurement
rules whose biases are conditional on multiple thresholds; the optimality of an unconditionally
biased measurement rule is a knife-edge case that relies on perfect alignment of the agent’s
preferences and the informational environment.
This chapter makes several contributions. First, it provides a tractable method for analyz-
ing moral hazard without placing severe restrictions on the agent’s action set, properties of the
performance measure, or contractual form. Second, it introduces a novel analytical represen-
tation of an accounting system that is capable of capturing the features of many measurement
rules applied in practice, and which I believe has several potential applications in other settings.
Third, it contributes to the growing literature on the distributional properties of earnings by
rationalizing asymmetric tails and discontinuities, and by providing testable predictions about
the determinants of asymmetry. Fourth, it contributes to the literature on accounting measure-
ment by rationalizing conditionally-biased measurement rules with all-or-nothing recognition
properties. Finally, this chapter contributes to the compensation literature by rationalizing
the use of bonus caps, floors, and hurdle bonuses in accounting-based bonus plans – a feature
7that has received very little prior theoretical support – and by producing falsifiable predictions
about the location of hurdles and the size of the incentive zone.
1.1 A general and flexible framework for the study of moral hazard
I consider a single period principal-agent model in which an agent has control over some asset
owned by the principal. The agent chooses the distribution of fundamental earnings pi ∈
{pi0, pi1, ..., piN}, where pii is strictly increasing in i for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. As in Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987), I allow the agent direct control over each probability pi for i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where p0 = 1−
∑N
i=1 pi ensures that the probabilities sum to one.
As this assumption plays a critical role in the upcoming results, some discussion of its
appeal is warranted. One interpretation is that the agent selects multiple actions from a rich
set that, when combined, interact to produce the desired distribution. As Holmstrom and
Milgrom point out, even if the agent chooses a one-dimensional action such as effort, the ability
to condition this action on private information received after the contract is signed expands the
agent’s control over the unconditional distribution. Alternatively, the agent could be choosing
a sequence of contingent one-dimensional actions over time; such a contingent strategy also
maps into a prior unconditional distribution at the outset. Holmstrom and Milgrom conclude
that “[i]n short, we could permit rather arbitrary production and information technologies and
still have the reduced form map into [this] conceptually simple structure....” Not only does the
assumption seem to implicitly capture many real world situations in which the agent has some
degree of productive flexibility, but it is arguably more descriptive than the more commonly
employed one-dimensional action assumption.
I denote reported earnings by x ∈ {x0, x1, . . . , xN}, and without loss of generality I assume
that xi = pii for all i. Departing from Holmstrom and Milgrom, I assume that the agent’s utility
is additively separable in wealth and effort, where the nonpecuniary cost of effort is denoted
8c(p) and is strictly convex in pi for all i. I assume that c(p) is twice differentiable and additively
separable in the components of p, where ci ≡ ∂c(p)∂pi and cik ≡
∂2c(p)
∂pi∂pk
≥ 0, with equality if i 6= k,
for all i and k. I work in utility space and denote the agent’s wage in utiles conditional on
earnings realization xi by vi. The agent’s reservation utility is denoted v¯ and the inverse utility
function is denoted h(v), which is strictly increasing and convex in v. The principal is risk
neutral.
An accounting system is characterized by a set of conditional probabilities Pr(x|pi) for all
x and pi. Restricting N = 1 and allowing the conditional probabilities to be independent, this
accounting system is identical to that pioneered by Gigler and Hemmer (2001), which is often
illustrated in a form similar to Figure 1.1. If I were to insist that the conditional probabilities be
independent, then an extension to a model with N > 1 would cause the number of parameters
that characterize the accounting system to grow quadratically. Precisely, there would be exactly
N(N + 1) independent conditional probabilities to consider. Figure 1.2 illustrates the case in
which N = 3. The number of independent parameters suggests that tractibility becomes an
issue as N grows large.
I consider a more structured extension of the earnings process from Gigler and Hemmer
(2001) by imposing an explicit relationship among the conditional probabilities Pr(x|pi). Let the
accounting system be characterized by the set of parameters Θ ≡ {δ0, ..., δN−1} ∪ {γ1, ..., γN},
and denote θi ≡ δi + γi. Noise is determined by θi, whereas bias is determined by δi and
γi. If pii is realized, then the accounting system measures pii aggressively with probability δi,
conservatively with probability γi, and neutrally or without bias with probability 1−θi. Whereas
the probable direction of bias is determined by γi and δi, the probable magnitude of bias is
determined by the noise associated with adjacent outcomes. Specifically, if pii is measured
conservatively, then x is equal to the largest pi < pii that is measured neutrally. Conversely, if
9pii is measured aggressively, then x is equal to the smallest pi > pii that is measured neutrally.
Under this structure there are exactly 2N parameters that determine the N(N + 1) con-
ditional probabilities; the number of parameters is increasing linearly rather than quadrat-
ically in N . For mathematical expediency and with little loss of generality, I assume that
Pr(xi|pi0) = Pr(x0|pii) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Figure 1.3 illustrates this accounting system.
While more complex than the binary case in Figure 1.1, it is much more manageable than the
unstructured extension in Figure 1.2. Notably, there are only two instead of N measurement
parameters to consider for each outcome, making it similar to the binary structure in terms of
tractability.
It will be useful to distinguish among ranges of the outcome space that are informationally
distinct from the others. I say that two adjacent ranges {pil, . . . , pim−1} and {pim, . . . , pin} are
informationally distinct if a fundamental outcome in one range is never accompanied by an
earnings realization in the other. That is, I exogenously restrict Pr(xi|pik) = 0 if pii and pik are
not in the same informationally distinct range. Let J ≥ 1 be the number of informationally
distinct ranges partitioning Π ≡ {pi1, . . . , piN}. Then each of these J ranges can be written
Πj ≡ {pimj , . . . , pinj} where mj = nj−1 + 1. Analogously, define Xj ≡ {xmj , . . . , xnj} for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Finally, redefine γmj ≡ Pr(xmj |pimj) and δnj ≡ Pr(xnj |pinj) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , J}.
Figure 1.4 illustrates this modification.
These informationally distinct ranges can be given a variety of interpretations. For example,
the measurement system may easily distinguish gains from losses but be unable to reliably
identify the magnitude of a particular gain or loss (J = 2). Or it may produce reports that
are precise up to the thousandth dollar, leaving only the trivial determination of rounding up,
down, or to the nearest thousand to the accountant (N = kJ for some k ∈ N). On the opposite
extreme, the accounting system may be unable to cleanly separate any range of outcomes from
the others (J = 1), in which case the distinction is vacuous.
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With this structure in place, the law of total probability allows the distribution of reported
earnings to be written
P(xi) ≡ Pr(xi|p,Θ) =
nj∑
k=mj
Pr(xi|pik)pk for all i ∈ {mj, . . . , nj}, (1.1)
where Pr(xi|pik) = 0 if i and k are in different informationally distinct ranges and
Pr(xi|pik) = ∂ P(xi)∂pk =

(1− θi)δk
i−1∏
l=k+1
θl if k < i
(1− θi) if k = i
(1− θi)γk
k−1∏
l=i+1
θl if k > i
(1.2)
otherwise, using the convention that
∏k
i (·) = 1 if i > k.5
Parallel to the definition in Gigler and Hemmer (2001), I say that the measurement rule
is conservative, unbiased, or aggressive over Πj if E[x|x ∈ Xj] is respectively less than, equal
to, or greater than E[pi|pi ∈ Πj]. Specific measurement rules can be constructed by considering
different combinations of bias over different ranges. For J informationally distinct ranges,
there are 3J possible measurement rules each specifying whether the accounting system is
conservative, unbiased, or aggressive over each Πj. The following definition characterizes a few
special cases that are common in practice.
Definition 1.1. Let gains and losses be informationally distinct, and define jø such that pimjø =
0. Then
1. An accounting system applies fair value if it is unbiased over Πj for all j.
2. An accounting system applies the realization rule if it is aggressive over Πj for all j < jø
and conservative over Πj for all j ≥ jø.
5This reported earnings distribution is equivalent over Π to the distribution of sanitized earnings in Shin (1994)
if J = 1 and δi = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}.
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3. An accounting system is conditionally conservative if it is unbiased over Πj for all j < jø
and conservative over Πj for all j ≥ jø.
4. An accounting system is unconditionally conservative if it is conservative over all Πj.
To illustrate, consider an asset with some unrealized change in fundamental value as of the end of
the period. The realization rule specifies that these unrealized changes in value not be recognized
on the balance sheet or income statement; that is, unrealized gains are measured conservatively
and unrealized losses are measured aggressively. In contrast, conditional conservatism specifies
that unrealized losses, but not gains, be recognized in the current period. For example, the lower
of cost or market rule for inventory valuation specifies that unrealized gains should be ignored,
or treated conservatively, whereas unrealized losses should be recognized at their presumably
unbiased market value.
1.2 Incentive-compatible production, measurement, and contracts
I begin by establishing the relationship among production, measurement, and contracts in this
setting. A key result is that the measurement rule and the contract serve as substitutes in
motivating productive activity, where the sensitivity of the agent’s action to the measurement
rule (contract) is increasing (decreasing) in the severity of measurement error.
The principal’s program can be written
max
p,v
N∑
i=0
piipi −
N∑
i=0
h(vi) P(xi)
s.t.
N∑
i=0
vi P(xi)− c(p) ≥ v¯
p ∈ argmax
p˜
N∑
i=0
viP˜(xi)− c(p˜).
(1.3)
By the law of total probability, P(xi) =
∑N
k=0 Pr(xi|pik)pk. As long as pi is a sufficient statistic
for p with respect to (pi, x) (which is easily verified to be the case under (1.1) and (1.2)), then
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Pr(xi|pik) is independent of p for all i and k, which implies that P(xi) is linear in p.6 Together
with the convexity of c(p), this implies that the agent’s expected utility is strictly concave in pk.
Thus the incentive compatibility constraint’s first order conditions are necessary and sufficient
for an interior solution.
Notice that there are exactly N such first order conditions and one individual rationality
constraint. These constraints form a system of N + 1 equations in N + 1 unknown payments,
which admits a unique solution under the usual conditions. Theorem 3 of Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987) leverages this feature to characterize a unique contract that implements any
given action. The following proposition is its analogue in this setting.
Proposition 1.1. Let P(x) ≡ Pr(x|p,Θ) characterize some earnings process in which pi is
a sufficient statistic for p with respect to (pi, x). For some v0 chosen to bind the individual
rationality constraint, suppose that {vi}ni=m is the unique solution to the following system of
equations for each (m,n) ∈ {(m1, n1), . . . , (mJ , nJ)}:

cm
cm+1
...
cn−1
cn

=

Pr(xm|pim) Pr(xm+1|pim) · · · Pr(xn−1|pim) Pr(xn|pim)
Pr(xm|pim+1) Pr(xm+1|pim+1) · · · Pr(xn−1|pim+1) Pr(xn|pim+1)
...
...
. . .
...
...
Pr(xm|pin−1) Pr(xm+1|pin−1) · · · Pr(xn−1|pin−1) Pr(xn|pin−1)
Pr(xm|pin) Pr(xm+1|pin) · · · Pr(xn−1|pin) Pr(xn|pin)


vm − v0
vm+1 − v0
...
vn−1 − v0
vn − v0

(1.4)
Then {vi}Ni=0 is the unique wage scheme that implements p given Θ.
The system of equations in Proposition 1.1 establishes the relationship among actions,
measurement, and contracts. The vector on the left hand side of (1.4) consists of marginal
costs that characterize the action chosen by the manager. The square matrix on the right hand
side consists of the conditional probabilities that characterize the measurement rule. Finally,
6By definition, pi is sufficient for p with respect to (pi, x) if Pr(x|pi, p) = Pr(x|pi).
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the vector on the right hand side consists of the earnings-contingent payments that characterize
the contract. Each component is cleanly separated by (1.4).
It is clear that incentive compatible actions are determined by both the contract and
the measurement rule. However, these actions are more or less sensitive to variation in the
contract versus the measurement rule under certain conditions. For example, suppose that the
accounting system is perfectly precise, so that Pr(xi|pik) is equal to one if i = k and is equal
to zero otherwise. Then the matrix in (1.4) reduces to the identity, and ci = vi − v0 solves
the system. In this case, the action taken by the manager is highly sensitive to contractual
variation.
Now, for expositional expediency suppose that n = m+2 and denote k ≡ m+1. Moreover,
invoke the earnings process specified by (1.1) and (1.2) with δm = γn = 0. Then (1.4) reduces
to 
cm
ck
cn
 =

1 0 0
γk 1− θk δk
0 0 1


vm − v0
vk − v0
vn − v0
 . (1.5)
Notice that the contractual payments vm− v0 and vn− v0 completely determine cm and cn, but
ck becomes less sensitive to vk − v0 as measurement error increases. Specifically,
ck = γkcm + (1− θk)(vk − v0) + δkcn −−−→
θk→θ
 vk − v0 if θ = 0γkcm + δkcn if θ = 1.
Holding cm and cn fixed, ck becomes less sensitive to variation in vk − v0 and more sensitive to
variation in (γk, δk) as θk increases. In the limit, ck depends completely on the measurement
rule and is unaffected by vk−v0. Even for θk < 1, the contract’s effective control over productive
activity wanes as θk gets large. To illustrate, if the principal wishes to implement an action
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satisfying ck 6= γkcm + δkcn while holding the measurement rule fixed, then he must choose
vk → ±∞ as θk → 1. Diminishing marginal utility of wealth renders vk → ∞ especially
expensive for the principal, and for utility functions that are bounded above (such as the
negative exponential) such wages are infeasible. Moreover, limited liability precludes any wage
satisfying vk → −∞ for a large class of utility functions.
Notice from (1.2) that Pr(xk|pii) is continuous and monotonic in θl for all i, k and l. While
θi ∈ (0, 1) is of primary interest, continuity and monotonicity allow me to gain a clear picture of
the role of measurement error on optimal actions, measurement rules, and contracts by simply
considering the more tractable endpoints. It is therefore with little, if any, loss of generality
that I confine attention to the extreme cases in which θi = 0 and θi = 1 for all i ∈ {mj, . . . , nj}.
For the latter case, as illustrated in Figure 1.5, the only possible earnings realizations in Xj are
xmj and xnj , which implies that the only contractual payments that are relevant for the agent’s
action are vmj − v0 and vnj − v0.
Under this assumption, the relative importance of the measurement rule versus the contract
is varied by changing the size of each informationally distinct range. If nj = mj + 2, then the
contract determines two thirds of the agent’s chosen probabilities (cnj and cmj), whereas the
measurement rule determines one third of the agent’s chosen probabilities (ckj). On the other
hand, if J = 1 then the implemented distribution is maximally dependent on the measurement
rule: the contract determines only two of the agent’s chosen probabilities (c1 and cN) whereas
the measurement rule determines all other productive activity (c2, c3, . . . , cN−1). The following
proposition formalizes this statement.
Proposition 1.2. Let P(x) ≡ Pr(x|p,Θ) be the earnings process characterized by (1.1) and
(1.2). For each (m,n) ∈ {(m1, n1), . . . , (mJ , nJ)}, suppose that θi = 1 for all i ∈ {m, . . . , n}.
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For any fixed payments vn, vm, and v0, an incentive compatible action must satisfy
ci = γi(vm − v0) + δi(vn − v0) for all i ∈ {m, . . . , n}. (1.6)
That is, the incentive compatible action is uniquely determined by the measurement rule. Fur-
thermore, if γn = δm = 0 then (1.6) reduces to ci = γicm + δicn, which is nondecreasing and is
convex, linear, or concave in i over {pim, . . . , pin} only if the measurement rule is respectively
conservative, unbiased, or aggressive over {pim, . . . , pin}.
The intuition behind the first result is simple. The agent increases the probability of
state pii until the marginal cost of bringing about that state is equal to the expected marginal
payment in that state; that is, ci = E[v|pii] − v0. Moreover, whereas the contract specifies the
degree of potential variation in ci via vm and vn, the measurement rule precisely determines
that variation through the selection of (γi, δi) for each i ∈ {m, . . . , n}. Holding the payments
fixed with vn > vm, ci is increasing in δi and decreasing in γi. That is, aggressive measurement
leads to greater effort, all else equal, because it increases the probability that the agent receives
the high payment.7
The second statement in Proposition 1.2 is also easily demonstrated. Substituting δi+γi = 1
into (1.6) yields an equation for the unique measurement rule that implements a given action
with fixed payments vn, vm, and v0:
δi =
ci−(vm−v0)
vn−vm for all i ∈ {m, . . . , n}
γi =
(vn−v0)−ci
vn−vm for all i ∈ {m, . . . , n}.
(1.7)
7This statement should be interpreted with caution, since the principal chooses the payments vm and vn with
the measurement rule in mind. To see this, notice that if δi = 1 for all i then the agent selects an action
satisfying ci = vn − v0, whereas if γi = 1 for all i then the agent selects an action satisfying ci = vm − v0. The
equilibrium level of effort is the same under both regimes, since the optimal choice of vn in the first is equal to
the optimal choice of vm in the second.
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If δm = γn = 0, then γi =
cn−ci
cn−cm is decreasing in ci and δi =
ci−cm
cn−cm is increasing in ci. If ci
is increasing convex (concave), then δi must be less than (greater than) γi on average, which
implies that the measurement rule is conservative (aggressive). Figure 1.6 illustrates the result.
This correspondence between the convexity of ci and the direction of bias forms a powerful
basis for characterizing optimal measurement rules.
1.3 Stewardship-oriented production, measurement, and contracts
Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 demonstrate that the measurement rule and the contract act as substi-
tutes in determining productive activity, and that the former becomes relatively more important
as measurement error increases. I now turn to the characterization of optimal productive ac-
tions, measurement rules, and contracts when measurement error is unavoidable, assuming that
the objective is to solve the moral hazard problem by maximizing the contracting parties’ joint
welfare (i.e., the stewardship objective).
I begin by characterizing first and second best actions without measurement error. Both
benchmarks can be obtained by analyzing the following program:
max
p,v
N∑
i=0
piipi −
N∑
i=0
h(vi)pi
s.t.
N∑
i=0
vipi − c(p) ≥ v¯
ci = vi − v0 for all i.
(1.8)
Substituting the incentive compatibility constraints into the objective function and taking the
first order condition with respect to v0 yields λ =
∑N
i=0 h
′(v0 + ci)pi, where λ is the positive
Lagrange multiplier on the individual rationality constraint. The first best benchmark can
be obtained by considering a risk neutral agent; that is, by setting h(v) = v which yields
h′(·) = λ = 1. The first and second best actions now follow immediately from the first order
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condition with respect to pi:
pii − pi0 = ci, (FBi)
pii − pi0 = (h(v0 + ci)− h(v0)) + (h′(v0 + ci)− λ)ciipi. (SBi)
The left hand side of (SBi) represents the marginal productive benefit of increasing pi. The
right hand side represents the marginal cost to the principal, which is the composition of two
terms. The first term, h(v0 + ci) − h(v0), represents the change in the distribution of dollar
wages resulting from the increase in pi. The second term, (h
′(v0 + ci)− λ)ciipi, represents the
change in wages needed to ensure that the increase in pi is incentive compatible while continuing
to bind the individual rationality constraint. Since ciipi is positive, incentivizing a higher pi
always slackens the individual rationality constraint, thereby allowing the principal to recover
at least some of the cost of stronger incentives. In fact, the agent’s diminishing marginal utility
of wealth allows the principal to recover more than this cost when ci is small; this can be seen
by noting that λ = E[h′(v0 + ci)], which implies that the second term is negative for ci roughly
below average.
Given Proposition 1.2, I am primarily interested in the concavity or convexity of ci implied
by (FBi) and (SBi). Since the left hand side of (FBi) is increasing linearly in i, the first best
action sets ci increasing linearly in i. In contrast, the first term on the right hand side of (SBi)
is convex in ci and thus promotes an action with ci concave in i. This, given the additive
separability of c(p), promotes thinner tails under (SBi) than under (FBi). The effect of the
second term is somewhat ambiguous, since h′(·) and ciipi could be concave or convex in ci, but
the term is certainly negative for small ci and positive for large ci. Since the right and left hand
sides of (SBi) must equate, it follows that the second term promotes a larger (smaller) ci under
(SBi) than under (FBi) when i is small (large). This can be interpreted as a downward shift in
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the fundamental earnings distribution. Thus the mean- and variance-reducing effects of moral
hazard documented by Holmstro¨m (1979), Rogerson (1985), and Sung (1995) are preserved in
this nonparametric setting without measurement error. Figure 1.7 illustrates these benchmarks,
assuming that the convexity in the first term on the right hand side of (SBi) dominates any
concavity in the second.
Having characterized the first and second best benchmark actions, I am now prepared
to analyze optimal actions, contracts, and measurement rules in a second best setting with
measurement error. I hereafter refer to this as the third best setting. I substitute (1.7) into the
expression for P(xi) so that the principal jointly chooses an action and its incentive compatible
measurement rule in the program given by (1.3). Since δi and γi must lie within the interval
[0, 1], (1.6) requires that ci ∈ [vmj − v0, vnj − v0] for all i ∈ {mj, . . . , nj}. The modified program
can now be written
max
p,v
N∑
i=0
piipi −
N∑
i=0
h(vi) P(xi)
s.t.
N∑
i=0
vi P(xi)− c(p) ≥ v¯
vnj − v0 ≥ ci for all i ∈ {mj, . . . , nj} and j ∈ {1, . . . , J}
vmj − v0 ≤ ci for all i ∈ {mj, . . . , nj} and j ∈ {1, . . . , J}.
(1.9)
Let νi denote the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint specifying vnj − v0 ≥ ci (δi ≤ 1) and let
µi denote the multiplier on the constraint specifying vmj − v0 ≤ ci (γi ≤ 1). I now characterize
the solution to this program.
Proposition 1.3. Assume that pii − pi0 is linear in i and that vn > vm for each (m,n) ∈
{(m1, n1), . . . , (mJ , nJ)}. Then the principal implements an action and measurement rule sat-
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isfying
pii − pi0 = (h(vm)γi + h(vn)δi − h(v0)) +
(
h(vn)−h(vm)
vn−vm − λ
)
ciipi + (νi − µi)cii, (TBi)
where
n∑
i=m
µi =
(
h(vn)−h(vm)
vn−vm − h′(vm)
)
P(xm) and
n∑
i=m
νi =
(
h′(vn)− h(vn)−h(vm)vn−vm
)
P(xn). (1.10)
Moreover, if the agent is risk averse, if P(xm) > 0, if P(xn) > 0, and if ci is nondecreasing in
i, then cm = vm − v0 and cn = vn − v0.
The right hand side of (TBi) is composed of three terms, the first two of which have
counterparts in (SBi). However, it is the third term, (νi − µi)cii, that drives most of the novel
results in this chapter.
1.3.1 Earnings asymmetry, all-or-nothing measurement, and bonus caps and floors
Recall that νi and µi are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints requiring that vm − v0 ≤
ci ≤ vn − v0 for all i ∈ {m, . . . , n}. As long as ci is nondecreasing in i, (1.10) reveals that µi
increases for small i and νi increases for large i as the agent becomes more risk averse or as
measurement error raises the probability of extreme earnings. Intuitively, measurement error
exposes the agent to additional tail risk, which compels the principal to squeeze vn and vm
closer together to reduce the risk premium.
Reducing vn and increasing vm comes at the cost of underproduction on the high end of
Πj and overproduction on the low end of Πj. Since ci is bounded between vm− v0 and vn− v0,
the third best action exhibits a region just above pim and just below pin in which γi and δi are
respectively equal to one, µi and νi are respectively positive, and the marginal costs are flat. If
i is not in either of these regions, then an interior measurement rule is optimal and µi = νi = 0,
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in which case the third term disappears from (TBi).
The resulting action specifies marginal costs that are capped below and above, as illustrated
in Figure 1.8. Notice that the total variation in marginal costs under the third best is bounded
by the total variation under the second best, a feature that is verified by the following lemma.
Lemma 1.1. For all (m,n) ∈ {(m1, n1), . . . , (mJ , nJ)},
1. cm = vm − v0 is greater in the third best than in the second best, and
2. cn = vn − v0 is smaller in the third best than in the second best.
Given the assumption that c(p) is additively separable in pi, Lemma 1.1 immediately implies
that the lower (upper) tail of the fundamental earnings distribution is thicker (thinner) in the
third best than in the second best, which is also illustrated in Figure 1.8.
Corollary 1.1. If J = 1 then the third best action leads to a fundamental earnings distribution
with a thinner upper tail and a thicker lower tail than does the distribution implemented by the
second best action.
It also follows immediately that the caps (floors) are implemented by a measurement rule
that sets δi = 1 (γi = 1), implying a very aggressive (conservative) measurement rule in
this region. Figure 1.9 illustrates this feature. Note that whenever the marginal costs fall
above (below) the line connecting cm and cn, the implementing measurement rule is aggressive
(conservative).
Corollary 1.2. The third best action is implemented by a measurement rule that is conservative
over low outcomes and aggressive over high outcomes within each informationally distinct range,
a feature of “all-or-nothing” recognition criteria.
Finally, recall that the incentive compatibility constraint without measurement error spec-
ifies ci = vi − v0, which hints at the optimality of a contract that also exhibits floors and caps
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when θi ∈ (0, 1). This conjecture can be verified. The following lemmas characterize the opti-
mal contract and measurement rule for a fixed action when θi ∈ (0, 1); the corollary combines
these results with Proposition 1.3 to establish that measurement error creates a demand for
caps and floors in the accounting-based bonus plan.
Lemma 1.2. Suppose that θi ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ {m, . . . , n}. Let
¯
vi ≡ E[v|pii, x < xi] denote
the expected wage when pii is realized and measured conservatively, and let v¯i ≡ E[v|pii, x > xi]
denote the expected wage when pii is realized and measured aggressively. If the principal chooses
vi and δi, γi ∈ (0, θ) to implement some action p, then he chooses vi strictly between
¯
vi and v¯i.
Lemma 1.3. Suppose that θi ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ {m, . . . , n}, with δm = γn = 0. If the principal
chooses δi, γi, and vi to implement an action in which ci is capped above and below, then the
optimal contract exhibits bonus caps and floors.
Intuitively, the contractual payment vi and the aggressive parameter δi act as substitutes
in incentivizing higher effort. To illustrate, cn−1 = cn can only be incentivized if the agent’s
expected wage given pin−1 is the same as his expected wage given pin. If vn−1 < vn, the only
way to accomplish this is to set δn−1 = 1. But θn−1 < 1 precludes such a measurement rule;
thus vn−1 = vn is optimal. Similar logic applies to all i satisfying ci = cn, and a symmetric
argument holds for all i satisfying ci = cm.
Now, the objective function and all constraints in the program characterized by (1.9) are
continuous in θi, so the optimal action p approaches that characterized by Proposition (1.3) as
θi increases to one. Since this action specifies marginal costs that are capped below and above,
the following corollary now follows immediately from Lemma 1.3.
Corollary 1.3. The optimal limiting contract as θi → 1 for all i exhibits bonus caps and floors
at the boundaries of each informationally distinct range.
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If J = 1, Corollary 1.3 leads to an accounting-based bonus plan that has similar features
to that described by Murphy (1999). Specifically, it consists of a single floor, a single incentive
zone in which vi is increasing in i (see Lemma 1.2), and a single cap. The only feature from
Murphy (1999) that is missing from my analysis thus far is the hurdle bonus, which is a discrete
jump in compensation at the boundary of the bonus floor and the incentive zone. In the next
section I show that hurdle bonuses also arise optimally in my setting at predictable thresholds.
1.3.2 Discontinuities, conditional bias, and hurdle bonuses
In the prior section I considered the implications of Proposition 1.3 within informationally
distinct ranges. I now consider its across-range implications. Two results immediately follow
by simply noting that Lemma 1.1 holds at the boundary of any informationally distinct ranges.
Corollary 1.4. The third best contract exhibits a hurdle bonus at the boundary of each infor-
mationally distinct range relative to the second best contract.
Corollary 1.5. The fundamental earnings distribution implemented by the third best action
exhibits a discontinuity relative to the distribution implemented by the second best action at the
boundary of each informationally distinct range. Moreover, under the economically plausible
condition that ci > ci−1 whenever pi = pi−1, there exists a region to the left and to the right of
each boundary over which the third best action satisfies pi declining in i.
Intuitively, the principal shields the agent from measurement risk by flattening the contract
over imprecisely measured regions, which naturally leads to a hurdle bonus at the boundaries
of each region. These bonuses incentivize the agent to implement a fundamental earnings
distribution exhibiting a discontinuity at the bonus threshold. Figure 1.10 illustrates this
result.
Corollary 1.2 demonstrates that third best measurement rules are conservative with respect
to low outcomes and aggressive with respect to high outcomes within any informationally
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distinct range. I now consider how average bias varies across ranges. To accomplish this, I
turn to the first two terms on the right hand side of (TBi) and consider how they differ from
those on the right hand side of (SBi). The first term, h(vm)γi + h(vn)δi − h(v0), is increasing
linearly in δi and therefore in ci; thus the demand for concave ci promoted by the first term in
(SBi) is neutralized by measurement error. Given Proposition 1.2, this implies that the optimal
measurement rule is completely determined by the second and third terms in (TBi).
The second term in (TBi),
(
h(vn)−h(vm)
vn−vm − λ
)
ciipi, differs only from the second term in (SBi)
in that the marginal cost of incentivizing pi is constant rather than increasing in i ∈ {m, . . . , n}.
This is because additional effort is incentivized by increasing δi, leading to a linear increase in
expected dollar wages, as opposed to increasing vi, which leads to a convex increase in expected
dollar wages. By the convexity of h(·), the marginal cost of incentivizing pi for small (large) i
is larger (smaller) in the third best than in the second best. This causes probability mass to
shift from the lower end of Πj to the upper end of Πj for all j.
More importantly, the second term in (TBi) preserves the property that the net marginal
cost of providing incentives is negative for small j and positive for large j, since the cost of
increasing incentives over small (large) j can (cannot) be fully recovered by tightening the slack
in the individual rationality constraint. This implies that the second term in (TBi) changes
concavity exactly once over Π, provided the concavity of ciipi is robust to p. This observation
motivates the following corollary.
Proposition 1.4. Suppose that for any p, ciipi is concave (convex) in i. If νi and µi are
sufficiently close to zero for all i, then there exists some j∗ such that the third best action
satisfies ci concave (convex) over Π
j for all j < j∗ and convex (concave) over Πj for all j ≥ j∗.
That is, given Proposition 1.2, the direction of bias optimally reverses at a single threshold. For
example,
1. If ciipi is strictly concave in i and if pimj∗ = 0 then the realization rule is optimal.
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2. If ciipi is strictly concave in i over gains and is linear (weakly concave) in i or ci over
losses then conditional conservatism is optimal.
3. If ciipi is linear in i or ci then fair value is optimal.
Of course, the usefulness of Proposition 1.4 depends on the existence and descriptiveness of
cost functions in which the properties of ciipi are relatively robust to p. The following example
demonstrates that such cost functions exist.
Example 1.1. Suppose c(p) =
∑N
i=1 bip
1+ai
i where bi > 0 for all i and ai > 0 is nonincreasing
in i. Then ciipi = aici, and it is straightforward to show the following:
1. For any p, if ai is sufficiently convex (concave) then ciipi is also convex (concave).
2. If ai is constant in i, then ciipi is linear in ci and fair value is optimal.
3. If ai is weakly concave in i, then conservative measurement of high outcomes is optimal.
The first observation is that the type of robust cost functions needed to invoke Proposition
1.4 exist and have economically defensible properties. The second observation implies that the
popular quadratic cost function creates a stewardship demand for unbiased measurement. The
third observation is that conservative measurement of high outcomes is optimal whenever ai is
concave or linear in i, the latter being an arguably neutral ex ante assumption.
A heuristic proof of these three observations follows. Define a(i) ≡ ai, c(i) ≡ ci, and
C(i) ≡ a(i)c(i). Assume for the moment that i is chosen from a continuum and that a(·) and
c(·) are twice continuously differentiable functions. Then
C ′′(i) = a(i)c′′(i) + 2a′(i)c′(i) + a′′(i)c(i), (1.11)
where a(i) > 0, c(i) > 0, a′(i) ≤ 0, and c′(i) > 0. If a′′(i) is sufficiently positive (negative),
then C ′′(i) is also positive (negative), proving the first observation. The second observation
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follows directly from Proposition 1.4. Finally, suppose to the contrary that a(i) is decreasing
and weakly concave and that the optimal measurement rule does not treat high outcomes
conservatively; that is, a′(i) < 0, a′′(i) ≤ 0, and c′′(i) ≤ 0. Then each of the terms on the
right hand side of (1.11) is nonpositive and the second is strictly negative, so C ′′(i) < 0. But
c′′(i) ≤ 0 and C ′′(i) < 0 over high outcomes contradicts Proposition 1.4, thereby proving the
result.
The impact of the third term in (TBi) on average bias over Π
j can be determined by
(1.10); notice that the magnitude of the flat regions just above and below pim and pin are loosely
proportional to P(xm) =
∑n
i=m piγi and P(xn) =
∑n
i=m piδi, respectively. If p is uniform,
then the flat region above pim is larger (smaller) than the flat region below pin whenever ci
is increasing convex (concave) between these regions. In this case, the third term in (TBi)
enhances the demand for the measurement rule implied by Proposition 1.4.
On the other hand, if pi is increasing (decreasing) in i over Π
j, then P(xm) is relatively
smaller (larger) than P(xn), all else equal. In turn, (1.10) yields a flat region just above
pim that is smaller (larger) than the region below pin, which implies a demand for aggressive
(conservative) reporting. It follows that if p is bell-shaped and centered at zero, so that pi is
increasing over losses and decreasing over gains, then the third term in (TBi) promotes the
realization rule.
Conclusion
I have demonstrated that a very general version of the moral hazard problem is able to ratio-
nalize empirically descriptive earnings distributions, measurement rules, and contracts. First,
I follow Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and grant the agent intricate control over the produc-
tion function by allowing him to directly choose the probability of each outcome. Second, I
introduce a novel analytical representation of an accounting system that admits a large class of
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measurement rules applied in practice. In this setting, I show that the measurement rule and
the contract act as substitutes in inducing productive activity.
My first set of results relies on a form of measurement error that increases the dispersion of
reported earnings. I show that this type of measurement error promotes fundamental earnings
distributions with asymmetric tails, measurement rules with “all-or-nothing” features, and
contracts with bonus caps and floors. My second set of results relies on the ability of the
accounting system to cleanly distinguish fundamental performance that exceeds some threshold
from performance that falls short. In this setting, I show that measurement error promotes
hurdle bonuses in the optimal contract, discontinuities in the fundamental earnings distribution,
and measurement rules that are conditionally biased.
Thus far, I have assumed that the principal has control over the contract and the mea-
surement rule, and is thus able to easily induce any productive action that he chooses. In
the next chapter, I introduce an accounting regulator who is able to exert influence over the
measurement rule. In this setting, the principal must design the contract to mitigate the short-
comings of a suboptimal measurement rule, but he only partially does so in equilibrium. Thus
the accounting regulator is able to influence the actions agreed upon by the contracting parties,
and therefore has some control over aggregate production in the economy.
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Chapter 2
What You Measure is What You Get:
Standardizing Production through Uniform Reporting
The merits of uniform accounting standards have been hotly debated in recent decades. While
comparability – which specifies that like things look alike and different things look different –
is widely acknowledged to be a worthwhile aim, academics and standard setters have pointed
out that uniformity does not necessarily imply comparability. On the one hand, uniformity
could keep firms from accounting for similar transactions differently, while on the other hand,
uniformity could force dissimilar phenomena to look alike (FASB 2010). While these arguments
are important, both assume that transaction characteristics are independent of the accounting
standards in place. Indeed, the accountant’s favorite proverb “what you measure is what you
get” suggests an alternative role for uniform reporting: it may not just make unlike things look
more alike, but it may actually cause them to be more alike in the first place.
In this chapter I present a case in which uniform reporting causes firms with different risk
preferences to adopt similar risk profiles. Whereas in Chapter 1 I assume that productive ac-
tivity, measurement rules, and contracts are all chosen with the purpose of solving the moral
hazard problem in the context of a single principal-agent relationship, this chapter allows for
multiple heterogeneous principal-agent pairs who contract on a measurement rule that is man-
dated by an accounting regulator. I assume that firms are inclined to contract on publically
available financial reports because (i) information production and verification is costly, (ii)
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contracts that reward agents following poor public performance are unlikely to be sustainable,
and (iii) complete separation of financial and managerial accounting systems is unlikely to be
optimal and is not empirically descriptive (e.g., Hemmer and Labro 2008, Dichev et al. 2013).
The first modification to my set-up from Chapter 1 is the introduction of heterogeneous
firms. To fix ideas, I consider firms whose preferences vary over downside risk. Extremely poor
fundamental performance in any given period is likely to lead to differential long term conse-
quences depending on the firm’s financial health and competitive environment. For example,
some firms may suffer from liquidity problems in the event of poor short-term performance,
which would force the firm to tap into external financing sources at a relatively higher cost.
Moreover, temporary poor performance could keep the firm from gaining a strong competitive
foothold in certain markets. In contrast, limited liability or the liquidation option could dampen
the consequences of poor short-term performance to the shareholders of particular firms. Based
on these arguments, aversion to downside risk is likely to depend on factors that vary across
firms.
The second modification to my set-up is the introduction of an accounting regulator. A
foundational insight from Chapter 1 is that measurement error renders the agent’s action less
sensitive to variation in the contract and more sensitive to the properties of the measurement
rule. In this chapter, the contract is designed by the principal, whereas the measurement rule
is mandated by the accounting regulator. Thus the regulator’s influence over production is tied
to the degree of measurement error in the accounting system.
In a multiperiod version of the model, I derive an explicit link between timely measurement
and aggregate measurement error based on the assumption that uncertainty is resolved over
time. Thus an accounting regulator can plausible choose his sphere of influence over productive
activity by mandating the timeliness of financial reporting. Importantly, this also implies that
my analytical representation of an accounting system is able to capture features of historical
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cost, current value, timely loss recognition, and timely gain recognition through appropriate
specifications of the noise parameters.
I confine my attention to the effect of a single pervasive measurement rule, timely loss
recognition, on productive activity. The model predicts that a uniform application of timely
loss recognition reduces (increases) downside risk within the subset of firms that are less (more)
averse to it. That is, timely loss recognition reduces variation in downside risk across firms.
While prior empirical studies have demonstrated that timely loss recognition promotes the
selection of more profitable projects on average (e.g., Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2011),
this chapter provides cross-sectional predictions pertaining to the same tests. For example, I
predict that timely loss recognition actually increases the selection of bad projects among firms
with poor liquidity.
2.1 Equating timeliness with measurement error in a multiperiod model
Consider a T period version of the model described in Chapter 1, where the managed asset
has a fixed operating cycle of two periods. While the asset’s period t change in fundamental
value pit ∈ {pi0, pi1, . . . , piN} is not immediately observable, the accounting system produces a
timely but noisy estimate xt ∈ {x0, x1, . . . , xN}. For full generality, I impose no restrictions
on the conditional probabilities Pr(xt|pit), so (1.1) and (1.2) are allowed but not required. In
period t+ 1, the results from period t production are fully realized, and any measurement error
generated by the accounting system in period t is completely reversed. Thus period t earnings
can be written
yt ≡

x1 if t = 1
xt + (pit−1 − xt−1) if t ∈ {2, . . . , T}
piT − xT if t = T + 1.
(2.1)
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That is, earnings consist of a timely but noisy component xt generated during the current period
and a reversing accrual pit−1−xt−1 that corrects measurement error from the prior period. Notice
that this earnings process guarantees that
∑T+1
t=1 y
t =
∑T
t=1 pi
t, thereby capturing the property
that accrual accounting simply allocates economic income across periods.
While total economic income can be deduced from total earnings, a perfect deduction of
{pit}Tt=1 is not generally possible. To illustrate, if xt = pit + t approximates the current period’s
economic income with some noise, then in any given period yt = pit+t−t−1 is a noisy measure
of current period income confounded by reversals from prior periods. If aggregation precludes a
distinction between measurement error in the current period and error reversals from the prior
period, then a perfect deduction of {pit}Tt=1 is impossible.
While a timely, unbiased measure of economic income introduces noise to the earnings
process that cannot be fully filtered out over time, an untimely measure allows for a perfect
deduction of {pit}Tt=1. To see this, note that under historical cost accounting with xt = 0 for
all t, (2.1) reduces to yt = pit−1.1 It follows immediately from Holmstro¨m’s (1979) sufficient
statistic condition that historical cost accounting is at least weakly preferred by the principal
to any other measurement rule in this setting since it completely eliminates measurement error.
The above discussion constitutes a proof of the following result.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that realized income is a sufficient statistic for realized and unreal-
ized income with respect to the agent’s action, that uncertainty is resolved deterministically over
a fixed operating cycle, and that current period measurement error is aggregated with accrual
reversals from prior periods. Then historical cost accounting eliminates measurement error and
is optimal from a stewardship perspective.
Deterministic accrual reversals over multiple periods creates a moving support problem
1If the accounting system adheres to (1.1) and (1.2), then this can be done by applying Definition 1.2 with
J = 2, pin1 . pi0 = 0 . pim2 , and θi = 1 for all i.
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that complicates the characterization of optimal actions and contracts. While such a character-
ization is unnecessary for Proposition 2.1, I propose a reduced form representation that allows
timeliness to be captured in a static model. Specifically, I rely on the link between timeliness
and measurement error derived in the multiperiod model to exogenously equate timeliness with
measurement error in the static model from Chapter 1.
Definition 2.1. Consider the static model described in Chapter 1 with an accounting system
satisfying (1.1) and (1.2), and assume that fundamental gains and losses are informationally
distinct. Then,
1. An accounting system applies current value if it is noisy over gains and losses.
2. An accounting system applies historical cost if it is precise over gains and losses.
3. An accounting system applies timely loss recognition if it is precise over gains and noisy
over losses.
2.2 Influencing downside risk through timely loss recognition
With Definition 2.1 in hand, I now return to the more tractable static model from Chapter
1. Consider K principal-agent pairs, one for each firm, and suppose that each principal has
nonlinear preferences over short-term performance. As previously discussed, poor short-term
performance can lead to liquidity issues, trigger the liquidation option, or encourage asset
substitution due to limited liability, thereby inducing nonlinear preferences.
I model principal k’s nonlinear preferences through an additive component equal to φki
that accrues to the kth principal when pii is realized. Thus the principal’s utility is equal to
pii + φ
k
i − E[h(v)|pii] when the current period’s fundamental performance is equal to pii. Now,
a firm that is very averse to downside risk can be modeled by choosing φki such that pii + φ
k
i
becomes very small as i declines, whereas a firm that is less averse to downside risk can be
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modeled by choosing φki such that pii + φ
k
i “levels off” over small i. A parsimonious way to
capture this is to assume that pii+φ
k
i is increasing concave for firms that are particularly averse
to downside risk and increasing convex for firms that are not.
I also assume that the agent is risk neutral. This assumption removes risk-sharing consid-
erations from the optimal contract and measurement rule, allowing me to focus exclusively on
the demand for different risk profiles based on the nonlinear component φki . In this case, (TBi)
reduces to
φki + pii − pi0 = ci. (2.2)
That is, if the principal could choose the measurement rule, he would choose it such that the
convexity of ci matches the convexity of φ
k
i .
Of course, the measurement rule is chosen by the accounting regulator, not by the principal.
The following proposition presupposes a regulator who, for whatever reason, desires to mandate
timely loss recognition.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose J = 2 with pim2 = 0, and suppose that the accounting regulator
mandates timely loss recognition with δi and γi chosen to satisfy E [x|pii ∈ Π1] = pii. Then the
kth principal chooses contractual payments vm1 and vn1 to satisfy the following equation:
0 =
n1−1∑
i=m1
(φki + pii − pi0 − ci) γicii and 0 =
n1∑
i=m1+1
(φki + pii − pi0 − ci) δicii , (2.3)
where ci = γivm1 + δivn1 − v0 by (1.6). Moreover, if φki + pii is increasing concave (convex) in i,
then there exists some l ≥ 1 such that c1, c2, . . . , cl are chosen strictly greater (smaller) under
(2.3) than under (2.2).
Notice that if (2.2) were satisfied for firm k, then each term in (2.3) would be equal to zero.
However, since the principal does not choose the measurement rule, (2.2) will not in general
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be satisfied for all i. Therefore, the best the principal can do is choose vm1 and vn1 such that
(2.2) is satisfied on average. Intuitively, the principal chooses the boundary payments to “fit”
the implemented marginal costs, like a regression line, to the costs he would have chosen if he’d
had control over the measurement rule. This “fitting” causes the lower tail of marginal costs
to increase (decrease) for firms that are more (less) averse to downside risk. In other words, a
uniform application of timely loss recognition reduces variation in downside risk across firms.
Figure 2.1 illustrates this result.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have demonstrated two results. First, if uncertainty is resolved over time
then an accounting regulator can influence productive activity in the economy by mandating
timely measurement. Second, I have shown that timely loss recognition reduces the variation in
downside risk across firms: specifically, firms that are less averse to downside risk contract for
less risky actions, whereas firms that are more averse to downside risk are induced to contract
for riskier actions.
While perhaps significant in its own right, this chapter is meant to be more illustrative than
prescriptive. Specifically, my objective here is to show that this framework offers opportunities
to better understand the effect of financial reporting regulation on economic activity. With
further development, it is my hope that this framework will offer additional insight into issues
that have long interested accounting researchers such as uniformity, comparability, and standard
setting.
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Chapter 3
An Optimistic Case for Pessimistic Measurement:
Disabling Moral Hazard through Unconditional Conservatism
Criticisms of conservative reporting tend to be levied against its unconditional, rather than its
conditional, form. While its undesirability from a valuation perspective is perhaps self-evident,
even proponents of the stewardship or debt contracting objectives tend to favor conditional
conservatism over its unconditional counterpart. The following argument made by Ball and
Shivakumar (2005) is illustrative:
[U]nconditional biases reduce opportunities to account in a conditionally conserva-
tive fashion (for example, writing off assets at acquisition eliminates the opportunity
to impair them at the time of economic losses). Contracting based demand for a
known unconditional bias thus seems unlikely. Further, an unconditional bias of un-
known magnitude introduces randomness in decisions based on financial information
and can only reduce contracting efficiency.
Such statements call into question the longstanding practice of leaving most intangible assets,
such as research and development (R&D), off the balance sheet. Such assets are not immaterial,
since growth and long-term profitability often depend critically on their successful management.
If GAAP is efficient, then these assets must possess special characteristics that imply the
optimality of unconditionally conservative measurement.
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In this chapter I provide sufficient conditions for conservative bias and noise to be strictly
desirable given the stewardship objective. Specifically, if an optimistic agent has a rich set of
value-augmenting actions at his disposal, then a penalty contract designed after Mirrlees (1974),
which is characterized by a flat wage less a penalty in the event of very low earnings, can induce
first best allocations only if the measurement system is extremely noisy and conservatively
biased.
The result relies on two main ingredients. The first is an assumption first employed
by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), namely that the agent has a large degree of flexibility
when choosing which fundamental earnings distribution to implement. Such flexibility causes
a penalty contract to lead to particularly undesirable actions when measurement is precise.
This occurs because the agent can avoid penalties in many different ways, and the cheapest
penalty-avoidance strategy is the one that allows for maximum shirking. Intuitively, the agent
works until fundamental earnings lie “just above” the penalty zone, then withholds productive
effort thereafter as argued by Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995).
While abandoning the flat wage scheme overcomes this problem, it is not the only recourse.
Productive activity can be recovered by substituting variation in the contract with variation
in the measurement system. Noise disrupts the agent’s otherwise intricate control over the
reported earnings distribution, and conservatively-biased noise puts any agent in danger of
incurring the penalty, no matter how precise his control over fundamentals. To the extent that
closing entries governed by conservative measurement rules deflate reported earnings by some
seemingly random amount, agents are inclined to exert productive effort even over ranges in
which compensation is flat.
While noise and conservative bias are able to render the first best action incentive compat-
ible via a penalty contract, this does not by itself imply that such a contract is Pareto efficient:
a penalty contract may impose too much risk on the agent. Thus the second ingredient in my
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model is that the agent be optimistic about the odds of avoiding a penalty-triggering earnings
report. This optimism causes the agent to charge a smaller risk premium when offered a penalty
contract, thereby ensuring the joint optimality of the first best action and the penalty scheme
as the probability of incurring the penalty goes to zero.
There is a burgeoning literature on CEO overconfidence and optimism. According to a
count by Malmendier and Tate (2015), “about two-dozen articles in top economics and finance
journals have been published on the topic” since 2005, and I have identified a handful of related
papers in top accounting journals over the past five years. Prior analytical studies in these
literatures operationalize CEO optimism (overconfidence) by introducing upward bias to the
perceived mean (precision) of a noisy signal. Given the nonparametric nature of the production
function in my setting, I take a more flexible approach. I assume that the agent is a rank
dependent expected utility (RDEU) maximizer who attaches decision weights to each objective
probability. Characterizations of optimism and pessimism are standard in the RDEU literature.
Loosely speaking, an optimistic agent tends to overweight the probability of good outcomes and
underweight the probability of bad outcomes.
According to Machina (1994), rank dependent expected utility is “the most natural and
useful modification of the classical expected utility formula,” and Starmer (2000) observes that
it has “proved to be one of the most popular among economists.” Like expected utility theory,
RDEU has an axiomatic development with many pleasing normative properties.1 For exam-
ple, preferences under RDEU are transitive and they respect first order stochastic dominance.
Another appealing feature is that expected utility theory is a special case of RDEU, so it is
straightforward in many situations to evaluate whether classical results extend to the more
general framework.
1The critical feature of RDEU is a weakening of the independence axiom, which is without a doubt the most
often questioned and violated axiom in expected utility theory.
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In sum, I show that managerial optimism enables the reduction and, in limiting cases, the
elimination of agency costs when paired with unconditionally conservative measurement rules.
Going beyond the notion that conservatism “offsets managerial biases” (see, for example, Watts
2003), my model provides the additional insight that optimism and unconditional conservatism
interact to create simple and efficient contracts.
This finding leads to two broad empirical predictions. First, optimistic agents receive less
variable compensation and demand lower risk premia than do neutral or pessimistic agents.
This is consistent with Otto (2014), who finds that optimistic CEOs receive smaller stock option
grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than do their peers. Second, assets
are more likely to be measured in an unconditionally conservative fashion (i) if their values can
be augmented through many different types of productive activities and (ii) if their stewards are
optimistic with respect to reported earnings. Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) find that firms
with optimistic CEOs invest more in innovation and achieve greater innovative success for given
research and development expenditures. To the extent that these optimistic, innovative agents
have a rich set of value-augmenting actions at their disposal, the model rationalizes uncondi-
tionally conservative treatment of research and development and other innovation-dependent
intangibles.
3.1 A rank dependent expected utility representation of optimism
The model in this chapter is very similar to that employed in Chapter 1, so in the interest of
parsimony I outline only the main differences here. The most notable addition to the basic
setup is a very low earnings outcome denoted
¯
x < x0 < x1 < . . ., which can be interpreted as
the average of all possible earnings realizations below x0. The accounting system is as described
before, except that pi0 ∈ Π1, J = 1 (so j no longer indexes informationally distinct ranges), and
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δi = 0 for all i; that is, only conservative biases are permitted.
2 Define the set Γ ≡ {γ0, ..., γN}.
Now, if pii is realized then the accounting system measures pii conservatively with probability
γi and neutrally or without bias with probability 1−γi. Again, if pii is measured conservatively,
then x is equal to the largest pi < pii that is measured neutrally. Figure 3.1 illustrates this
altered structure.
Denote P(xi) ≡ Pr(xi|p,Γ). With the above alterations, (1.1) and (1.2) reduce to
P(xi) = (1− γi)
N∑
k=i
pk
k∏
j=i+1
γj and P(
¯
x) =
N∑
k=0
pk
k∏
j=0
γj, (3.1)
using the convention that
∏k
i (·) = 1 if i > k. It is straightforward to verify that
∂ P(
¯
x)
∂pk
= Pr(
¯
x|pik)− γ0 = −γ0
(
1−
k∏
j=1
γj
)
,
∂ P(x0)
∂pk
= Pr(
¯
x|pik)− (1− γ0) = −(1− γ0)
(
1−
k∏
j=1
γj
)
,
∂ P(xi)
∂pk
= Pr(xi|pik) =

0 if k < i
(1− γi) if k = i
(1− γi)
k∏
j=i+1
γj if k > i > 0.
(3.2)
Mirrlees (1974) obtains approximate first best allocations through penalty contracts by
sending the penalty zone to negative infinity while increasing the size of the penalty. A sym-
metric approach for bonuses is ineffective if the agent exhibits decreasing marginal utility of
wealth. To replicate Mirrlees’ strategy, I need to take the lower tail of the reported distribution
2Aggressive biases are benign in this chapter and lead to no Pareto improvements, so I omit this feature for the
sake of simplicity.
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to negative infinity, which I accomplish parsimoniously by taking
¯
x → −∞. The penalty is
administered upon the occurrence of report
¯
x.
I now introduce a rank dependent expected utility (RDEU) maximizing agent. My brief
summary of RDEU draws heavily on the excellent exposition by Quiggin (1992). RDEU is
characterized by a transformation of probabilities into decision weights. The weights are de-
termined by a cumulative weighting function q : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] that takes into account both the
magnitude of each probability and the ranking of each outcome. Whereas an expected utility
maximizing agent solves
¯
v P(
¯
x) +
N∑
i=0
vi P(xi)− c(p),
an RDEU maximizing agent solves
¯
v
¯
g(P) +
N∑
i=0
vigi(P)− c(p),
where P ≡ (P(
¯
x),P(x0), . . . ,P(xN)), the cumulative mass function is denoted ρi ≡ Pr(x ≤ xi)
and
¯
ρ ≡ Pr(x ≤
¯
x) = P(
¯
x), and
gi(P) ≡ q(ρi)− q(ρi−1) for all i > 0,
g0(P) ≡ q(ρ0)− q(
¯
ρ), and
¯
g(P) ≡ q(
¯
ρ).
(3.3)
The weights assigned to each probability can be assessed by considering the slope of q over each
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segment of the cumulative mass function. (3.3) implies that
P(xi) = ρi − ρi−1

> gi(P) if
q(ρi)−q(ρi−1)
ρi−ρi−1 < 1
= gi(P) if
q(ρi)−q(ρi−1)
ρi−ρi−1 = 1
< gi(P) if
q(ρi)−q(ρi−1)
ρi−ρi−1 > 1.
In words, the agent underweights segments of the cumulative mass function over which q′(ρ) < 1
and overweights segments over which q′(ρ) > 1. It follows that an agent with a convex weighting
function increasingly underweights less desirable outcomes and increasingly overweights more
desirable outcomes. That is, he is optimistic. Conversely, an agent with a concave weighting
function increasingly overweights less desirable outcomes and increasingly underweights more
desirable outcomes. That is, he is pessimistic. Finally, an expected utility maximizer has a
linear weighting function. These cases are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
The functional form associated with RDEU was independently discovered by several dif-
ferent researchers, the first being Quiggin (1982). He provided the first axiomatic basis for the
theory and demonstrated that the decision weights gi(P) must depend on the cumulative rather
than individual probabilities if violations of stochastic dominance are to be avoided.
One rediscovery is worth mentioning. Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987) develop a
generalized expected utility theory often referred to as Choquet Expected Utility, named after its
use of Choquet integrals in calculating expectations with non-additive subjective probabilities.
Such subjective probabilities tend to self-manifest in problems characterized by ambiguity, or
uncertainty regarding the distribution of outcomes. This generalization was later shown to be
equivalent to RDEU when preferences respect first order stochastic dominance (see Wakker
1990).
Segal (1987, 1990) argues that ambiguity can be modeled as a two-stage lottery, where
the first lottery determines the probability distribution over outcomes and the second lottery
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produces an outcome from that distribution. Segal derives some fairly restrictive sufficient
conditions for a single stage lottery to be preferred to a two stage lottery, and one of these
conditions is pessimism. When these conditions are not satisfied, an agent may actually prefer
an ambiguous lottery to an unambiguous one.
My model shares some common features with Segal’s. Segal and I both assume that the
agent is a rank dependent expected utility maximizer. Reported earnings in my model is,
in fact, the result of a two-stage lottery: the first lottery produces a fundamental outcome
which determines the probability distribution over earnings reports, and the second lottery
produces an earnings report from that distribution. While I do not formalize the connection
here, it seems plausible that my model can be reinterpreted as one of earnings ambiguity
under Segal’s framework. If so, a manager who is optimistic may prefer to obtain only a high-
level understanding of the accounting process (that is, he prefers ambiguity) in order to avoid
information that is inconsistent with his optimistic decision weights.
3.2 Penalty contracts with negligible risk premia
I am now prepared to investigate the impact of noise, conservative bias, and optimism on
obtainable allocations in a moral hazard setting. The principal’s program is given by
max
p,vi
N∑
i=0
piipi −
N∑
i=0
h(vi) P(xi)− h(
¯
v) P(
¯
x)
s.t.
N∑
i=0
vigi(P) +
¯
v
¯
g(P)− c(p) ≥ v¯
p ∈ argmax
p˜
N∑
i=0
vigi(P˜ ) +
¯
v
¯
g(P˜ )− c(p˜).
(3.4)
Notice from (3.1) and (3.3) that P(xi) is a linear function of pk whereas gi(P) is a nonlinear
function of P. Absent additional assumptions, the incentive compatibility constraint’s first order
conditions are necessary but not sufficient for an interior solution; second order conditions must
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be verified as well. It turns out that the second order conditions are automatically satisfied
under a penalty contract if the agent is optimistic.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose the principal offers a penalty contract satisfying vi = v >
¯
v for
all i. If q′′(
¯
ρ) ≥ 0, then the agent’s first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for an
interior solution to the incentive compatibility constraint. Moreover, the pthk first order condition
specifies
1−
k∏
j=1
γj =
ck
q′(P(
¯
x))(v−
¯
v)γ0
. (3.5)
Notice from (3.5) that if γi = 0 for some i, then ci = ci+1 = . . . = cN = q
′(P(
¯
x))(v −
¯
v)γ0. This is because any outcome above pii guarantees that the penalty will not obtain, and
the cheapest way to ensure penalty avoidance is to equate the marginal costs in this region.
Such actions are very undesirable: they are the types of actions chosen by the agent absent
incentives.3 It follows that any accounting system that renders a penalty contract incentive
compatible while promoting productive activity must allow for conservative measurement.
In contrast, a conservative system is capable of inducing c1 < c2 < . . . < cN because it
leaves the manager exposed to the penalty no matter which fundamental outcome is realized.
The manager has a natural incentive to allocate more effort towards outcomes that are far
from
¯
x because these outcomes are less likely to result in a penalty-triggering earnings report.
The desired variation in ci can be induced by a penalty contract if the degree of conservatism
is correctly calibrated for each outcome. While many incentive compatible calibrations of the
measurement system and penalty are possible, for illustrative purposes I focus on the system
that is least biased.
3To see this, notice that if γ0 = 0 or v −
¯
v = 0 so that a penalty is never inflicted, the marginal costs are all
equated to zero.
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Proposition 3.2. Let q be convex and fix γN = 0. If p can be implemented via a penalty
contract, then the unique incentive compatible penalty and measurement system satisfy
v −
¯
v = cN
q′(P(
¯
x))γ0
and
γi =
cN−ci
cN−ci−1 for all i > 0.
(3.6)
While any conservative accounting system implements some action via a penalty contract,
this hardly guarantees that the principal will choose to implement that action and offer that
contract. There is at least one exception. If a particular accounting system, penalty contract,
and weighting function allow the first best action to be implemented with a negligible risk
premium, then the principal would be remiss to implement any other action.
Recall from (FBi) that the first best action satisfies
pik − pi0 = ck for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (3.7)
If one insists on implementing the first best action in a second best world through a penalty
contract, then the implementing accounting system from (3.6) is therefore given by γi =
piN−pii
piN−pii−1
for all i > 0. It remains only to characterize γ0. Notice that the structure imposed on the con-
ditional probabilities in this framework specifies that Pr(xi|pij) is nonincreasing in the distance
between i and j. In this spirit, I assume that γ0, which is equal to the conditional probability
of
¯
x given pi0, declines to zero as
¯
x → −∞. While any such relationship between γ0 and
¯
x is
sufficient for the following results, in the interest of consistency I assume that γ0 ≡ piN−pi0piN−
¯
x
takes
the same functional form as the other conservative parameters. This assumption implies that
Pr(
¯
x|pik) =
∏k
i=0 γi =
piN−pii
piN−
¯
x
for all k. With this accounting system in place, it follows from
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Proposition 3.2 that
P(
¯
x) =
∑N
k=0 pk(piN−pik)
piN−
¯
x
and v −
¯
v =
∑N
k=0 pk(piN−pik)
q′(P(
¯
x)) P(
¯
x)
. (3.8)
Since limρ→0 q′(ρ) is bounded between zero and one if the agent is optimistic, it is immediate
that P(
¯
x)→ 0 and v −
¯
v →∞ as
¯
x→ −∞. It remains only to assess limiting behavior of the
risk premium.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. q′′(ρ) ≥ 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
2. γ0 =
piN−pi0
piN−
¯
x
.
3. γi =
piN−pii
piN−pii−1 for all i > 1.
Then the risk premium is proportional to
q(P(
¯
x))
q′(P(
¯
x)) P(
¯
x)
.
If the agent is an expected utility maximizer, then
q(P(
¯
x))
q′(P(
¯
x)) P(
¯
x)
= 1 for all
¯
x. It follows that
the desirability of a penalty contract can be assessed by comparing this expression with unity
when the agent is optimistic versus pessimistic. Notice that
q(ρ)
q′(ρ)ρ < 1 ⇐⇒ q(ρ)−q(0)ρ−0 < q′(ρ),
which is equivalent to the convexity of q. Thus the risk premium charged by an optimistic
agent is less than the risk premium charged by an expected utility maximizing or pessimistic
agent. The following examples illustrate that the risk premium can be made arbitrarily small
by making the agent sufficiently optimistic or by taking the penalty zone to negative infinity.
Example 3.1. Let q(ρ) = ρα. Then the risk premium is proportional to q(ρ)
q′(ρ)ρ =
1
α
−−−→
α→∞
0.
Since the risk premium can be made arbitrarily small by taking α→∞, a penalty contract
with the specified unconditionally conservative accounting system dominates any other contract
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and measurement rule in the limit. Moreover, the manager becomes more and more optimistic
that piN will materialize (gN(P)→ 1) as α→∞.
For the weighting function in Example 3.1, the risk premium only shrinks by making the
agent increasingly optimistic. The next example demonstrates that this is not required in
general.
Example 3.2. Let q(ρ) = e
1
2(ln
2(α)−ln2(αρ)) for some α ≤ e−
√
5+1
2 . Then q : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is an
increasing convex bijection, and the risk premium is proportional to q(ρ)
q′(ρ)ρ =
1
− ln(αρ) −−→ρ→0 0.
For this weighting function, the risk premium is made arbitrarily small by taking
¯
x→ −∞
and P(
¯
x) → 0 for a fixed level of optimism. This case is more appealing than Example 3.1,
because extreme optimism over the entire distribution is not required to approximate first best
allocations. Indeed, extreme optimism actually causes the agent to exhibit risk seeking behavior
in the RDEU framework, which entices the principal away from offering an approximately risk
free contract in the first place. In contrast, extreme optimism in the lower tail is what makes a
penalty contract so attractive because the agent is minimally risk averse, or even risk seeking,
in this region.
Conclusion
While I have not allowed it here, an interesting feature of the RDEU framework is that an agent
who exhibits declining marginal utility of wealth can actually be risk seeking if he is sufficiently
optimistic. Moreover, in the RDEU framework extreme optimism and extreme overconfidence
are one and the same as the agent increasingly overweights the probability of the best outcome.
This feature potentially rationalizes several opposing empirical findings in the literature on
optimism and overconfidence. For example, Humphery-Jenner et al. (2016) find evidence that
overconfident executives, which they carefully distinguish from Otto’s (2014) optimistic CEOs,
receive more incentive-heavy compensation contracts. Given the opposing findings from these
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two studies, the distinction between overconfidence and optimism may be more than semantic.
When modeled through RDEU, it may be equivalent to the distinction between risk seeking
and risk averse preferences given an optimistic weighting function.
Additionally, Ahmed and Duellman (2013) provide empirical evidence that overconfident
CEO’s are less likely to apply conservative accounting methods, both conditional and uncon-
ditional. Hilary et al. (2016) find somewhat inconsistent results with respect to optimism.
They state that “measures of accruals or real earnings management are not affected by this
over-optimism,” and suggest that “managers, being over-optimistic regarding the likelihood of
meeting the expectations they set, do not feel the need to manage earnings in order to reach
their forecasts.” Again, if overconfidence leads to risk seeking behavior as suggested by the
RDEU framework, then the risk-free features of penalty contracts cease to be desirable and the
optimality of conservatism wanes.
I have shown that unconditional conservatism enables the principal to game the manager’s
optimistic behavioral profile. By offering a contract that focuses in on the behavioral quirk, the
principal can induce productive activity while settling up with a relatively small risk premium.
The required degree of noise and bias to pull off the result is extreme. If the fundamental
outcomes are evenly spaced, then
(γN , γN−1, γN−2, . . . , γ1, γ0) =
(
0, 1
2
, 2
3
, 3
4
, 4
5
, 5
6
, 6
7
, . . . , N−1
N
, piN−pi0
piN−
¯
x
)
.
Only γ0 approaches zero as
¯
x→ −∞, whereas the majority of the conservative parameters are
fixed very close to one provided N is large. Such extreme bias is not dissimilar to immediate
expensing: an accounting report of x0, which is very likely given this accounting system, implies
that the asset is not capitalized at all.
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Appendix A
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1: For k ∈ {mj, . . . , nj}, the sufficient statistic assumption implies that
P(xi) is linear in p, which yields
∂ P(xi)
∂pk
= Pr(xi|pik) by the law of total probability. It follows
that
∂ E[v]
∂pk
=
N∑
i=0
∂ P(xi)
∂pk
vi − ck =
nj∑
i=mj
Pr(xi|pik)(vi − v0)− ck = 0. (A.1)
Now the N first order conditions can be expressed in matrix notation b = Ax:

∇1
∇2
...
∇J−1
∇J

=

P1 0 · · · 0 0
0 P2 · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · PJ−1 0
0 0 · · · 0 PJ


v1
v2
...
vJ−1
vJ

,
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where
∇j ≡

cmj
cmj+1
...
cnj−1
cnj

, Pj ≡

Pr(xmj |pimj) · · · Pr(xnj |pimj)
...
. . .
...
Pr(xmj |pinj) · · · Pr(xnj |pinj)
 , and vj ≡

vmj − v0
vmj+1 − v0
...
vnj−1 − v0
vnj − v0

.
Since A is a block diagonal matrix, I can treat this large system of equations as J independent
systems written ∇j = Pjvj. As long as Pj is of full rank for all j, there exist unique utilities
v0, ..., vN that induce action p and bind the individual rationality constraint.
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Proof of Proposition 1.2: Dropping the subscripts, the jth system of equations can be written
 cmcm+1...
cn−1
cn
 =

1−θm (1−θm+1)δm ··· (1−θn−1)δm
n−2∏
i=m+1
θi (1−θn)δm
n−1∏
i=m+1
θi
(1−θm)γm+1 1−θm+1 ··· (1−θn−1)δm+1
n−2∏
i=m+2
θi (1−θn)δm+1
n−1∏
i=m+2
θi
...
...
. . .
...
...
(1−θm)γn−1
n−2∏
i=m+1
θi (1−θm+1)γn−1
n−2∏
i=m+2
θi ··· 1−θn−1 (1−θn)δn−1
(1−θm)γn
n−1∏
i=m+1
θi (1−θm+1)γn
n−1∏
i=m+2
θi ··· (1−θn−1)γn 1−θn


vm−v0
vm+1−v0
...
vn−1−v0
vn−v0
 .
Setting θi = 1 for all i ∈ {m, . . . , n} yields

cm
cm+1
...
cn−1
cn

=

γm 0 · · · 0 δm
γm+1 0 · · · 0 δm+1
...
...
. . .
...
...
γn−1 0 · · · 0 δn−1
γn 0 · · · 0 δn


vm − v0
vm+1 − v0
...
vn−1 − v0
vn − v0

.
Equation (1.6) immediately follows.
Suppose that ck is increasing convex in k so that
ck−cm
cn−cm <
pik−pim
pin−pim . Substituting δm = γn = 0
into (1.6) yields ci = γicm + δicn. These observations imply that
pinδk + pimγk = (pin − pim) ck−cmcn−cm + pim < (pin − pim)pik−pimpin−pim + pim = pik,
which implies that
n∑
i=m
pii P(xi) =
n∑
i=m
(pinδi + pimγi) pi <
n∑
i=m
piipi.
That is, the optimal system is conservative over {pim, . . . , pin}. Symmetrically, if ck is increasing
concave (linear) in k then the optimal system is aggressive (unbiased) over {pim, . . . , pin}.
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Proof of Proposition 1.3: First, it can be shown that
∑N
i=0 vi P(xi) = v0 +
∑N
i=1 cipi, which
allows the individual rationality constraint to be written v0 +
∑N
i=1 cipi− c(p) ≥ v¯. With choice
variables p, vmj , and vnj , and with multiplier λ on the individual rationality constraint, the
Lagrangian is given by
L =
N∑
i=0
piipi −
N∑
i=1
h(vi) P(xi) + λ
(
v0 +
N∑
i=1
cipi − c(p)− v¯
)
+
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=mj
µi(ci − vmj + v0) +
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=mj
νi(vnj − v0 − ci).
(A.2)
Substituting (1.7) into δi and γi for each i ∈ {m, . . . , n} yields
∂ P(xm)
∂pk
= ∂
∂pk
(
n∑
i=m
vn−v0−ci
vn−vm pi
)
= γk − ckkpkvn−vm
∂ P(xn)
∂pk
= ∂
∂pk
(
n∑
i=m
ci−vm+v0
vn−vm pi
)
= δk +
ckkpk
vn−vm
(A.3)
∂ P(xm)
∂vm
= ∂
∂vm
(
n∑
i=m
vn−v0−ci
vn−vm pi
)
=
n∑
i=m
vn−v0−ci
(vn−vm)2pi =
P(xm)
vn−vm
∂ P(xm)
∂vn
= ∂
∂vn
(
n∑
i=m
vn−v0−ci
vn−vm pi
)
=
n∑
i=m
ci−vm+v0
(vn−vm)2 pi =
P(xn)
vn−vm
∂ P(xn)
∂vm
= ∂
∂vm
(
n∑
i=m
ci−vm+v0
vn−vm pi
)
=
n∑
i=m
ci−vn+v0
(vn−vm)2pi =
−P(xm)
vn−vm
∂ P(xn)
∂vn
= ∂
∂vn
(
n∑
i=m
ci−vm+v0
vn−vm pi
)
=
n∑
i=m
vm−v0−ci
(vn−vm)2 pi =
−P(xn)
vn−vm ,
(A.4)
where m ∈ {m1, . . . ,mJ} and n ∈ {n1, . . . , nJ}. Using (A.3) and (A.4) in the first order
conditions of (A.2) with respect to pi, vm, and vn yields the result.
Finally, (1.10) strictly positive implies that δk = γl = 1 for at least one k and l between m
and n. It follows immediately that δn = γm = 1 as long as ci is nondecreasing in i.
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Proof of Lemma 1.1: Suppose for the moment that only µm and νn are positive. Then cn =
vn − v0 and cm = vm − v0. Substituting these into δi and γi yields the following Lagrangian:
L =
N∑
i=0
piipi −
J∑
j=1
h(v0 + cnj) P(xnj)−
J∑
j=1
h(v0 + cmj) P(xmj)− h(v0)p0
+λ
(
v0 +
N∑
i=1
cipi − c(p)− v¯
)
.
(A.5)
Suppressing the j subscripts, it can be shown that
∂ P(xm)
∂pk
= ∂
∂pk
(
n∑
i=m
cn−ci
cn−cmpi
)
=

1 + cmm
cn−cm
n−1∑
i=m+1
γipi if k = m
cnn
cn−cm
n−1∑
i=m+1
δipi if k = n,
∂ P(xn)
∂pk
= ∂
∂pk
(
n∑
i=m
ci−cm
cn−cmpi
)
=

− cmm
cn−cm
n−1∑
i=m+1
γipi if k = m
1− cnn
cn−cm
n−1∑
i=m+1
δipi if k = n.
(A.6)
The first order conditions of (A.5) with respect to pn and pm are respectively given by
pin − pi0 = h(v0 + cn)− h(v0) + (h′(v0 + cn)− λ)cnnpn
+
(
h′(v0 + cn)− h(v0+cn)−h(v0+cm)cn−cm
)
cnn
n−1∑
i=m+1
δipi
(A.7)
pim − pi0 = h(v0 + cm)− h(v0) + (h′(v0 + cm)− λ)cmmpm
−
(
h(v0+cn)−h(v0+cm)
cn−cm − h′(v0 + cm)
)
cmm
n−1∑
i=m+1
γipi (A.8)
Notice that the first lines of (A.7) and (A.8) are equivalent to (SBi). The second lines of (A.7)
and (A.8) are respectively positive and negative, implying that cn (cm) must be chosen smaller
(larger) in the third best than in the second best to ensure that the equalities hold.
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Proof of Lemma 1.2: Let
¯
hi and h¯i represent the expected dollar wages corresponding to
¯
vi and
v¯i. Fixing p and θi ∈ (0, 1) for all i, the principal chooses δi and vi to minimize the following
program:
min
vi,δi ¯
hiγi + h(vi)(1− θi) + h¯iδi
s.t. ci =
¯
viγi + vi(1− θi) + v¯iδi − v0.
(A.9)
That is, the principal chooses vi and δi, with γi ≡ θi− δi, to minimize the expected dollar wage
while satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint obtained from (A.1). Notice that if δi
and vi are varied while continuing to meet the constraint in (A.9), the agent’s chosen action
and expected utility remain unchanged, so the individual rationality constraint is automatically
satisfied.1 Solving the constraint for δi and substituting into the objective function yields
min
vi
h(vi)(1− θi) + (h¯i −
¯
hi)
ci−
¯
viθi+v0−vi(1−θi)
v¯i−
¯
vi
+
¯
hiθi.
The first order condition is given by
h′(vi)(1− θi)− h¯i−¯hiv¯i−
¯
vi
(1− θi) = 0.
The second order condition, h′′(vi)(1 − θi) > 0, reveals that this is indeed characterizes a
minimum. Thus the principal selects vi (and δi) so that h
′(vi) =
h¯i−
¯
hi
v¯i−
¯
vi
. By the convexity of
h(·), vi lies strictly between
¯
vi and v¯i.
1The agent’s cost of effort, c(p), is held constant by assumption, whereas his expected wage in utiles, E[v] =∑
i E[v|pii]pi, is constant by the right hand side of the constraint in (A.9).
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Proof of Lemma 1.3: The constraint in (A.9) can be rewritten
vi = v0 + ci +
ci−(
¯
vi−v0)
1−θi γi +
ci−(v¯i−v0)
1−θi δi.
(A.10)
I begin with the capped region, which satisfies ci = vn − v0. Note that v¯n−1 = vn by definition.
Thus for i = n− 1, (A.10) reduces to
vn−1 = vn +
vn−
¯
vn−1
1−θn−1 γn−1 +
vn−v¯n−1
1−θn−1 δn−1 = vn +
vn−
¯
vn−1
1−θn−1 γn−1 ≥ vn,
with a strict inequality if γn−1 > 0. But vn−1 > vn = v¯n−1 contradicts Lemma 1.2, implying
that γn−1 must equal zero. Thus vn−1 = vn, which implies that v¯n−2 = vn. Let the inductive
hypothesis be that v¯i = vn in the capped region. Then (A.10) reduces to
vi = vn +
vn−
¯
vi
1−θi γi +
vn−v¯i
1−θi δi = vn +
vn−
¯
vi
1−θi γi ≥ vn,
with a strict inequality if γi > 0. But vn−1 > vn = v¯n−1 contradicts Lemma 1.2, implying that
γi must equal zero. Thus vi = vi+1 = . . . = vn, which implies that v¯i−1 = vn. By the principle
of mathematical induction, if ci is capped then so is vi.
The proof that vi exhibits a floor whenever ci exhibits a floor is perfectly symmetric to the
proof for a cap.
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Proof of Proposition 1.4: Fixing νi = µi = 0 for all i and recalling from Proposition 1.3 that
cmj = vmj − v0, (TBi) can be rewritten
pii − pi0 = h(vnj )−h(vmj )vnj−vmj (ci − cmj) + h(vmj)− h(v0) +
(
h(vnj )−h(vmj )
vnj−vmj
− λ
)
ciipi.
Define αj ≡ h(vnj )−h(vmj )
vnj−vmj
. Subtracting (TBmj) from (TBi) yields
pii − pimj = αj(ci − cmj) + (αj − λ) (ciipi − cmjmjpmj). (A.11)
Choose j∗ such that αj − λ is positive (negative) for all j ≥ j∗ (j < j∗).2
Case 1: j ≥ j∗. The left hand side of (A.11) is linearly increasing in i. Since αj − λ > 0, if
ciipi is concave (convex) in i for all j ≥ j∗, then ci must be convex (concave) in i.
Case 2: j < j∗. The left hand side of (A.11) is linearly increasing in i. Since αj − λ < 0, if
ciipi is concave (convex) in i for all j < j
∗, then ci must be concave (convex) in i.
Case 3: ciipi = a
jci. Then (A.11) can be rewritten pii − pimj = (αj + (αj − λ)aj) (ci − cmj),
which implies that ci is linear in i over {pimj , . . . , pinj}.
2This is always possible since αj is the slope of nonoverlapping secant lines connecting increasing points on a
convex function and is therefore increasing in j, whereas λ is a weighted average of h′(v0) and {αj}Jj=1. To see
this, define qj ≡
∑nj
i=mj
pi. Then the first order condition with respect to v0 reveals that
λ = h′(v0)p0 +
J∑
j=1
αjqj +
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=mj
(νi − µi). (A.12)
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Proof of Proposition 2.2: Recall that the agent is risk neutral, and let the principal take γi and
δi as exogenous. Then the principal chooses vmj and vnj to maximize the following program:
max
vmj ,vnj
pi0 +
N∑
i=1
(φki + pii − pi0)pi − v¯ − c(p)
s.t. ci = γivmj + δivnj − v0 for all i ∈ {mj, . . . , nj} and j ∈ {1, . . . , J},
where the individual rationality constraint is substitutited directly into the objective function
since the agent is risk neutral. Implicitly substitute the incentive compatibility constraints
into the objective function so that pi is an implict function of vmj and vnj . Suppressing the
j subscripts, apply the chain rule and differentiate the incentive compatibility constraint to
obtain ∂pi
∂vm
= ∂pi
∂ci
∂ci
∂vm
= γi
cii
and ∂pi
∂vn
= ∂pi
∂ci
∂ci
∂vn
= δi
cii
. Using this and the total derivative of c(p),
the first order conditions for vm and vn are respectively given by
0 =
n−1∑
i=m
(φki + pii − pi0 − ci) γicii and 0 =
n∑
i=m+1
(φki + pii − pi0 − ci) δicii .
With little if any loss of generality, let |Πj| = 3 and denote l ≡ n − 1 = m + 1. Noting that
δm = γn = 0, these first order conditions can be rearranged and combined to yield
φkm+pim−pi0−cm
γlcmm
=
cl−(φkl +pil−pi0)
cll
= φ
k
n+pin−pi0−cn
δlcnn
. (A.13)
Suppose that γl and δl are chosen such that ci is linear in i. Then for φ
k
i concave (convex) in
i, (A.13) is negative (positive), which implies that cm is greater than (less than) φ
k
m + pim− pi0.
Recalling that (2.2) specifies cm = φ
k
m + pim − pi0, the result immediately follows.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1: It easily follows from (3.3) that
¯
g(P) +
∑N
i=0 gi(P) = 1. Recall that
¯
g(P) = q(P(
¯
x)). Rewriting the principal’s program under the assumption that vi = v >
¯
v for
all i yields
max
p,v,
¯
v
N∑
i=0
piipi −
N∑
i=0
h(vi) P(xi)− h(
¯
v) P(
¯
x)
s.t. v − q(P(
¯
x))(v −
¯
v)− c(p) ≥ v¯
p ∈ argmax
p˜
v − q(P(
¯
x))(v −
¯
v)− c(p˜).
It follows from (1.1) that P(
¯
x) is a linear function of p. Since composition with a linear mapping
preserves convexity or concavity, q ◦ P is convex (concave) if q is convex (concave). If q and c
are both convex, then the incentive compatibility constraint is a concave function of p, implying
that the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for an interior solution.
This result can be obtained explicitly. Using (1.2), the agent’s first order condition with
respect to pk is given by
∂EU
∂pk
= −q′(P(
¯
x))(Pr(
¯
x|pik)− γ0)(v −
¯
v)− ck = 0, (A.14)
which yields (3.5), and the second partial derivatives can be written
∂2EU
∂pk∂pj
= −q′′(P(
¯
x))(v −
¯
v)(γ0 − Pr(
¯
x|pik))(γ0 − Pr(
¯
x|pij))− ckj. (A.15)
Claim: The square matrix B with kjth entry bkbj ≡ (γ0 − Pr(
¯
x|pik))(γ0 − Pr(
¯
x|pij)) is positive
semidefinite.
Proof of Claim: B is positive semidefinite if and only if its eigenvalues are nonnegative. Notice
that B = bbT, where
bT ≡
[
b1 b2 · · · bN−1 bN
]
.
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For some nonzero eigenvector x, the corresponding eigenvalue λ satisfies
λx = Bx = bbTx =⇒ λxTx = xTbbTx = (bTx)T bTx =⇒ λ = ||bTx||2||x||2 ≥ 0.

If q′′(P(
¯
x)) is positive, the Claim implies that the Hessian matrix consisting of the first
terms of each cross partial given by (A.15) is negative semidefinite. Since the sum of a negative
semidefinite and a negative definite matrix is negative definite, the second order condition
for a maximum is satisfied. The same cannot be said if q′′(P(
¯
x)) is negative, but since the
second order conditions hold when q′′(P(
¯
x)) = 0, continuity implies that they hold in some
-neighborhood of zero.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2: Solving the N th first order condition given by (3.5) for v −
¯
v with
γN = 0 yields v −
¯
v = cN
q′(P(
¯
x))γ0
. Substituting this into the 1st first order condition given by
(3.5) yields
1− γ1 = c1cN ⇐⇒ γ1 =
cN−c1
cN
.
Substituting this into the 2nd first order condition yields
1− γ2 cN−c1cN = c2cN ⇐⇒ γ2 =
cN−c2
cN
cN
cN−c1 =
cN−c2
cN−c1 .
Let the inductive hypothesis be that γi =
cN−ci
cN−ci−1 for all i < k. Then the k
th first order condition
can be written
1− γk
k−1∏
i=1
cN−ci
cN−ci−1 = 1− γk
cN−ck−1
cN
= ck
cN
⇐⇒ γk = cN−ckcN
cN
cN−ck−1 =
cN−ck
cN−ck−1 .
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Proof of Proposition 3.3: Substituting (3.8) into the individual rationality constraint yields
v = v¯ + c(p) + q(P(
¯
x))(v −
¯
v) = v¯ + c(p) +
q(P(
¯
x))
q′(P(
¯
x)) P(
¯
x)
N∑
k=0
pk(piN − pik). (A.16)
Since v¯ + c(p) is paid when the agent’s action is observable, the risk premium is equal to the
last term. Moreover,
∑N
k=0 pk(piN − pik) is constant in ¯x given the first best action. It follows
that the risk premium is proportional to
q(P(
¯
x))
q′(P(
¯
x)) P(
¯
x)
.
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Appendix B
Figures
Figure 1.1. Representation of the earnings process pioneered by Gigler and Hemmer (2001).
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Figure 1.2. Unstructured extension of the Gigler and Hemmer earnings process with N = 3.
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Figure 1.3. Structured extension of the Gigler and Hemmer earnings process with arbitrary
N assuming that pi = pii is realized.
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Figure 1.4. Illustration of the earnings process with J informationally distinct ranges, where
Πj ≡ {pimj , . . . , pinj}, Xj ≡ {xmj , . . . , xnj}, and Pr(x ∈ Xj|pi ∈ Πl) = 0 if j 6= l.
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Figure 1.5. Illustration of the earnings process assuming that θi = 1 for all i ∈ {mj, . . . , nj},
where γmj ≡ Pr(xmj |pimj) and δnj ≡ Pr(xnj |pinj) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , J}.
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Figure 1.6. Correspondence between the convexity of ci and the direction of bias.
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Figure 1.7. First best and hypothetical second best (no measurement error) marginal costs
and fundamental earnings distributions.
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Figure 1.8. Second best (no measurement error) and third best (measurement error) marginal
costs and fundamental earnings distributions with one informationally distinct range (J = 1).
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Figure 1.9. Implementing the third-best action through “all-or-nothing” measurement rules.
m n
vm − v0
vn − v0
Con
serv
ativ
e
Agg
ress
ive
δi =
ci−(vm−v0)
vn−vm
γi =
(vn−v0)−ci
vn−vm
i
ci
72
Figure 1.10. Second and third best marginal costs and fundamental earnings distributions
with ciipi linear in ci and two informationally distinct ranges (J = 2).
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Figure 2.1. The effect of timely loss recognition on downside risk for a firm that prefers
concave ci; that is, φ
k
i + pii is increasing concave.
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Figure 3.1. Representation of the model with δi = 0 for all i.
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Figure 3.2. RDEU probability weighting functions.
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